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Essays
In Communities Begin Responsibilities:
Obligations at the Gay Bar
by
WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN
David Wilkins asks:
[W]hat difference will it make to the long term struggle to end the legal,.
economic and political subjugation of blacks in the United States that a
substantial number of the most talented and best educated black lawyers
are likely to spend some or all of their careers in corporate law practice?1
David Wilkins answers: It depends. Wilkins argues that black cor-

porate attorneys have the potential to contribute to the eradication of racial subjugation, but that this potential will be fulfilled only if two preconditions are met. First, black attorneys must "recognize that they have
moral obligations running to the black community"; Wilkins calls this the
"obligation thesis." 2 Second, law schools must assist black law students
to "develop the critical skills and obtain the empirical knowledge that
they will need to define the scope of this race-based obligation and to

reach coherent and morally defensible judgments about how this duty
should be incorporated into their lives as corporate lawyers." 3
* Acting Professor, UCLA School of Law. This Essay began as remarks given as the
introduction to the Hastings Law JournalSymposium on March 29, 1997. At the time, I was a
visiting professor at Stanford Law School, which I thank for its support. I am also grateful to
the UCLA School of Law, under whose auspices my remarks were turned into this Essay, and
particularly for conversations with, and comments that I received on an earlier draft from,
Richard Abel, Alison G. Anderson, Devon Carbado, David Chambers, Mitu Gulati, Janet Halley, Nan Hunter, Arthur Leonard, Martha Minow, Anne Simon, and David Wilkins.
1. David B. Wilkins, Two Paths To The Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Educaton in
Shaping The Values ofBlack CorporateLawyers, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1981, 1983 (1993).
2. Id. at 1984.
3. Id.
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I would like to introduce this audience-one composed primarily of
lesbian, gay, and bisexual attorneys and those interested in queer law-to
Wilkins' obligation thesis (for those unfamiliar with it) and to begin (in
the limited time that I have) a preliminary exploration of the application
of this thesis to the gay bar. Thus, I ask: what difference will it make to
the long-term struggle to end the legal, economic and political subjugation of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals in the United States that a substantial number of the most talented and best educated gay lawyers-female and male, white and people of color-are likely to spend some or all
of their careers in corporate law practice?
My preliminary answer, like Wilkins', is: It depends. I will argue
that if lesbian, gay, and bisexual corporate attorneys are to become
agents of social change, three factors unique to these communities must
coalesce: First, the lesbian/gay community generally, and the gay bar
specifically, must attend more self-consciously than it has to date to the
concept of intra-community "responsibilities"; second, particular obligations of lesbian/gay corporate attorneys must be identifiable and identified, and, most specifically, "coming out" must be seen as neither sufficient nor, perhaps, always necessary to social change; and finally, queer
communities must develop more sophisticated means for reproducing intra-community obligations inter-generationally.
My Essay will proceed in three major parts. In Part I, I will perform the function I promised the Hastings Law Journal I would-I will
assess the changes in lesbian/gay law that have occurred in the eighteen
years since the Law Journal last held a symposium on this subject. In
Part II, before turning to a consideration of the obligations of "lesbian,
gay, and bisexual attorneys," I pause to reflect on a prior question-who
are these people? One of the limitations of speaking of the gay bar is that
there does not yet exist a sufficient description of the history, traditions,
and institutions of such an entity, much less a careful struggle with the
definitional question. Thus, in Part II, I sketch a brief history of the gay
bar and initiate a discussion of this question: What does it mean to be a
"lesbian, gay or bisexual lawyer"? 4 Finally, in Part III, I will turn to the
obligation thesis. There I will describe Wilkins' thesis about black cor-

4. I am here purposefully echoing Sanford Levinson's question, "What does it mean to
be a 'Jewish lawyer'?" See Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on
the Construction ofProfessionalIdentity, 14 CARDOZo L. REv. 1577, 1583 (1993).
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porate attorneys, consider its application to lesbian, gay, and bisexual
attorneys, and offer preliminary responses to some anticipated criticism.'
In undertaking this consideration, I have been significantly motivated
by two factors. First, when I practiced law at the ACLU, I came in

contact with attorneys in corporate practice who devoted significant energies to lesbian, gay, and bisexual rights and liberation. Their contribu-

tions, while enormously important in the fight against legal and social
homophobia, are often underacknowledged and thus do not serve as the
models that they should for encouraging more of such activity.' A sec5. A set of anticipated criticisms that I want to address at the outset concerns the implications of my borrowing Wilkins' thesis about black attorneys. First, it is important to bear in
mind the overlap of the subjects of each of our explorations. A significant minority of Wilkins'
subjects may also identify as lesbian, gay, and bisexual, while a significant percentage of lesbian, gay, and bisexual attorneys are people of color. (These overlaps are themselves merely
subsets of the many identity categories that constitute the subjects of our discussions-black
women in corporate law, lesbians of color at law firms, Jewish gay men in traditionally WASP
environments, etc.) Wilkins develops his obligation thesis with a broad brush across all African
Americans, though consciously acknowledging these dimensions; similarly, this initial discussion of a gay-obligation thesis speaks rather broadly (though in Part II quite self-consciously) of
the lesbian, gay, and bisexual community as well. For those falling at the many identity intersections, it may be necessary to develop a far more sophisticated "multi-obligation analysis"
than either Wilkins or I offer in sketching our theses. See also infra note 119.
A second concern of mine in borrowing Wilkins' analysis is that I not effortlessly import
strategies of the African American civil rights struggle into the gay rights movement. Thus, in
Part m, I take pains to analyze Wilkins' claims rather carefully and to consider their relationship to what is clearly a different contextual setting than that of which he writes.
Both of these concerns raise the interesting question of whether individuals' obligations to
their communities-both in origin and content-differ depending upon the nature of the community, or, in this context, depending upon the nature of the oppression that the community has
suffered. While I have preliminarily considered such questions elsewhere, see William B.
Rubenstein, Since When Is The Fourteenth Amendment Our Route to Equality? Some Reflections on the Construction of the "Hate-Speech" Debate From a Lesbian/Gay Perspective, in
SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE SPEECH, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
280 (1994), the limited scope of this Essay does not enable me to pursue my responses in more
depth here.
6. At the risk of excluding others, those with whom I worked most closely and who are
remarkable role models include Marc Wolinsky, a partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
who litigated, inter alia, Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en bane); David
Braff, a partner at Sullivan & Cromwell, who helped litigate Gay Teachers Ass'n v. Board of
Educ. of N.Y., 585 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1st Dept. 1992) and Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280
(2d Cir. 1996); Joe Tringali, a partner at Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, who litigated, inter alia,
Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552 (2d Cir. 1994); David Hollander, who, while a partner at
Morrison & Foerster, was the chair of the board of directors of Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund; and the late Craig Davidson (Webster & Sheffield; Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett)
and Michael Valentini (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom), two of the founders of the
Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD), see Craig J. Davidson & Michael G.
Valentini, CulturalAdvocacy: A Non-Legal Approach to Fighting Defamation ofLesbians and
Gays, 2 L. & SEXUALITY: REV. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL ISSUES 103 (1992).
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ond catalyst for my thoughts here, though, has been the unsatisfying dis-

course within the legal academy about the career paths available to law
students generally and to minority law students in particular. Part of the

socialization of law school is an implicit inculcation that two career paths
exist-public interest law for the good and everything else for the fallen.
Having practiced public interest law for nearly a decade, I lived with my
own anxiety about whether what I was doing was so unambiguously
good, while also experiencing the discomfort in my law school classmates' discussions of their corporate careers. What David Wilkins has
offered us with his obligation thesis is, in part, an opportunity to confront
the traditional framing of good and bad in legal careers, which is an op-

portunity to move beyond a paradigm that no longer fits, if it ever did,
careers at the bar.

I. Eighteen Years and Counting
In 1979, the Hastings Law Journal became the first law journal in

the United States to publish a symposium on sexual orientation law.7
Fourteen law journals have followed suit in the succeeding eighteen
years. 8 With this Symposium, the Journal earns a second "first" by becoming the first "second"-the first non-specialized law journal to host
two symposia on sexual orientation law. Given its location at the epicenter of homosexuality in America, it seems, somehow, appropriate.
7. See Symposium, Sexual Preference and Gender Identity, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799
(1979).
8. See Symposium, The Legal System and Homosexuality-Approbation,Accommodation,
or Reprobation?, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 445 (1985); Symposium, Sex, Politics, & The Law:
Lesbians & Gay Men Take The Offensive, XIV REy. L. & Soc. CHANGE 891 (1986); Elizabeth
Schneider et al., Lesbians, Gays, and Feminists at the Bar: Translating PersonalEperience
into Effective Legal Argument-A Symposium, 10 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 107 (1988); Symposium, The Family in the 1990s: An Exploration of Lesbian and Gay Rights, 1 L. &
SEXUALITY: REV. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1991); Symposium on Lesbian and Gay
Legal Issues, 16 QUEEN'S L.J. 231 (1991); Symposium, Legal Restrictions on Homophobic
and Racist Speech: Collateral Consequences on the Lesbian and Gay Community, 2 L. &
SEXUALITY: REV. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1992); Symposium, Genderand Law, 46
U. MIAMI L. REV. 503 (1992); Symposium on Sexual Orientation and the Law, 79 U. VA. L.
Ray. 1417 (1993); Symposium, Stonewall at 25, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 277 (1994);
Symposium, The Constitutionalityof Anti-Gay Ballot Initiatives, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (1994);
Symposium, Defining Family: Gays, Lesbians, and the Meaning of Family, 3 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J.285 (1994); Symposium on Sexual Orientation, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 1 (1995); Lesbians in the Law: Symposium Issue, 5 S.CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 5 (1995); Symposium, "Don'tAsk Don't Tell:" Gays in the Military, 64 UMKC L.
REV. 1 (1995). See also Developments in the Law-Seual Orientation and the Law, 102
HARV. L. REv. 1508 (1989).
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Nonetheless, even here, taking on and pushing forward these issues represents an achievement, and those who undertook this effort should be
acknowledged and praised for their work.
It is fairly simple to assess how much the law has changed in the
eighteen years between the first Hastings symposium in 1979 and this
one. In 1979, twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia had sodomy laws on their books, 9 while only twenty do today.1 ° In 1979, there
was not a single state-wide law banning sexual orientation discrimination" and only a handful of local ordinances.' 2 Of those, Rhonda Rivera
wrote, "Many of the ordinances are less than one year old; virtually none
are more than three years old." 3 Today there are nine state laws and
nearly two hundred municipal ordinances. 14 Relatedly, in early 1979,
there was not a single decision anywhere in the United States announcing
that lesbians and gay men were entitled to the equal protection of the
laws. By the end of 1979, the California Supreme Court had rendered15
such a decision in a case litigated on behalf of Hastings law students;
and of course, we now have a United States Supreme Court decision annunciating this principle,16 as well as a scattering of lower court decisions
to that effect.1 7 In 1979, there was no such thing as a "domestic partnership,"" and the idea of it-yes even the idea-was utopian. Rivera
wrote, "the legal institutions and policies of this country have only begun
to recognize [gay families'] needs ... alternatives to marriage and to
traditional means of raising a family are evidently still at the experimental
stage." 9 Today, dozens of municipalities and private entities (including
9. See Rhonda R. Rivera, OurStraight-LacedJudges: The Legal Position ofHomosexual
Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 949-51 (1979).
10. See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND THE LAW 148 (2d ed. 1997) (listing 22 states; subsequently, courts in Tennessee and
Texas found those state laws unconstitutional).
11. See Rivera, supra note 9, at 808-09.
12. See id. at 810 nn.61-62.
13. Id. at 810.
14. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 10, at 469. Since this Symposium presentation, New
Hampshire and Maine became the tenth and eleventh states to enact laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
15. See Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
16. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
17. See generally RUBENSTEIN, supranote 10, at 666-68.
18. Rivera's overview of lesbian and gay law, see supra note 9, never mentions the concept. Most writers credit the Village Voice with adopting the first domestic partnership plan in
1982. See, e.g., MATTHEW A. COLES, TRY THIS AT HOME: A DO-IT-YOURSELF GUIDE To
WINNING LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY 242 (1996).

19.

Rivera, supranote 9, at 908.
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many large national corporations) recognize same-sex partners20 and the
Hawaii Supreme Court appears to be on the verge of recognizing samesex marriages.2 1 In 1979, not even a handful of states treated lesbian
mothers and gay fathers involved in parenting disputes on the basis of
their parenting ability; most were displaced as parents solely because of
their sexual orientation.' Rivera noted that the great majority of cases
involving lesbian and gay parents had "occurred in the last five years," a
factor she attributed in part to "a growing pride on the part of most gay
parents and a growing support system to help them fight for the custody
of their children."' Thus, Rivera concluded that "some courts are beginning to evaluate homosexual parents on the basis of their parenting
abilities rather than on the basis of their sexual preference." 2 4 Today
most state courts at least profess to assess gay parents in terms of their
abilities.'5 In 1979, no states allowed second parent adoptions, while today roughly half-a-dozen states enable lesbian mothers or gay fathers to
jointly parent a child.26
I need not, for this audience, dwell on the cup still being half
empty-that same-sex private sexual relations are still illegal in twenty
states, that firing workers because they are gay is still legal in roughly
forty states, that no state provides equal recognition for same-sex relationships, and that lesbian/gay/bisexual parents are only beginning to be
treated fairly. Nor will I dwell on the abysmal legal situation of transgendered people or lesbian/gay/bisexual youth because our other speakers
will address these issues during the course of the Symposium. Because
20. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 10, at 765.
21. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (reinstating dismissed challenge to
Hawaii marriage law), reconsiderationgranted in part, 74 Haw. 650 (1993), on remand, Baehr
v. Milke, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct., Dec. 3, 1996) (declaring prohibition on same-sex
marriage unconstitutional and staying effect of decision), appealfiled. In reaction to these decisions, the Hawaii legislature enacted a law granting benefits to same-sex couples, while simultaneously authorizing a popular initiative that, if successful, will alter the state constitution to
enable the legislature to limit marriages to opposite sex couples. See Meld Cox, Hawaii to Extend Benefits to Gay Couples, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL
4874170.
22. See Nan D. Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: A Legal Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 691, 705 (1976) ("Taken as a whole,
the decisions in cases involving lesbian mothers and heterosexual fathers (or heterosexual mothers and homosexual fathers) indicate that few courts have recognized a need for the kind of
nexus requirement which we have suggested.").
23. Rivera, supra note 9, at 886.
24. Id. at 903-04.
25. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 10, at 810 n.11.

26. See id. at 873-74.
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the topic is not covered in other panels today, however, it is important to
note the overriding negative development during the eighteen years since
the first Hastings symposium-AIDS. The HastingsLaw Journalsympo-

sium issue of 1979 followed on a national gay law conference that was
held at the law school in 1978. It is chilling to consider that when the
participants at that conference gathered here, they did not know that a
fatal virus was silently coursing through the crowd that very day. A

number of the organizers of that very event were felled by the virus in
succeeding years, not to mention the tens of thousands of members of our
communities throughout the United States. The death of Tom Stoddard
this past month-an attendee at the 1978 Hastings conference and one of

the guiding forces of this legal movement 27-reminds us yet again that our
legal advances in these eighteen years will always have to be measured
against the toll exacted from us.
The 1979 symposium, the fourteen symposia that followed, and the
dozens of symposia on AIDS law that have also taken place in the past
decade,'8 have provided important insights for those fighting these legal
battles and also, in retrospect, provide an excellent history of these developments. Even issues that have not received broad attention elsewhere-such as the legal problems facing transgendered persons-are
discussed in these pages. For those who are not well-versed in these ar-

eas, I recommend a review of this history.
H. The Gay Bar
Before turning to the task of considering whether and how lesbian,
gay, and bisexual attorneys have obligations to their communities, we

must first consider the subject of that endeavor. 29 Two questions present
27. Stoddard was the Executive Director of Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund
from 1986-1992. During 1993, Stoddard ran the Campaign for Military Service. For a history
of Stoddard's contributions to lesbian/gay law, see Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 967 (1997).
28. For a listing, see Standing Committee on Lesbian and Gay Issues of the Social Responsibilities Special Interest Section of the American Association of Law Libraries, Sexual
Orientationand the Law: A Selective Bibliography on Homosexuality and the Law, 1969-1993,
86 L. LIB. J. 1, 45-46 (1994).
29. Developing a richer picture of the "gay bar" has benefits beyond its contribution to
promotion of the obligation thesis. First, pro-gay advocates are everywhere the subject of legal
discourse. Law review authors ceaselessly make suggestions about strategies and tactics that
"gay litigators should" pursue. Without naming their audiences for such recommendations,
they are each positing a readership, a group of attorneys and activists who are undertaking the
work being discussed. To talk explicitly about lesbian/gay attorneys is not, then, to introduce a
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themselves as possible subjects of study. First: Who are lesbian, gay,
and bisexual law students, lawyers, legal professionals, and law professors? (The "history" question.) Second: What information is transmitted when an individual is identified as a lesbian, gay, or bisexual lawyer,
legal professional or law professor? (The "identity" question.)
A.

History

The histories of how African Americans and women were discriminated against by the bar-and their resistances-are increasingly foci for
study, discussion, and scholarship. For nearly a century after the Civil
War, African Americans were denied the opportunity to attend law
schools, limited in their abilities to join the bar, and relegated, nearly exclusively, to providing legal services to other African Americans.30
Moreover, "[a]lthough the Supreme Court held racially segregated legal
education unconstitutional in 1950, formal policies of discrimination persisted at some accredited law schools until 1964. "31 In 1960, blacks
comprised 1% of the bar; in the early 1990s, "blacks, Hispanics, Native
Americans and Asian Americans accounted for almost a quarter of the
American population [but] constituted only about 12% of the nation's law
students, less than 8% of its lawyers, 6% of its law professors and 2% of
the partners at the nation's largest law firms."32 Women were also explicitly excluded from bar membership, an exclusion deemed constitutional in Myra Bradwell's case on the basis that female "differences"
rendered women unfit for work outside the home.33 By the 1920s, legal
barriers to women's membership in the bar were largely removed.3
However, societal forces continued to conspire against equal participation-as late as 1960, "women constituted less than 3% of the American
new topic, but simply to make explicit what has been implicit in gay legal theory. A second
reason that talking about the gay bar is important is that it begins to make explicit who lesbian/gay attorneys "are"-where we come from, how we are trained, what obstacles we have
faced, how we have overcome them, which obstacles remain, what our values are, what we envision the boundaries of "us" to be, etc. There is not yet a written history of lesbian/gay lawyers and lawyering-a tradition of actions and values that can be described, critiqued, and
passed down, and that, in turn, can provide roadmaps, lessons, inspiration, enthusiasm, and
role models for future generations.
30. See generally GERALDINE SEGAL, BLACKS INTHE LAW (1983).
31. DEBORAH L. RHODE& DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHics 70 (2d ed. 1995).
32. Id. at 89.

33. See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872). See generally KAREN MORELLO, THE
INVISmLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN AMERICA 1638 TO THE PREsENT (1986).
34. See RHODE& LUBAN, supranote 31, at 69.
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bar, and were largely excluded from fields of practice with the greatest
status, influence, and financial rewards." 35
Both blacks and women made the training of attorneys and the development of advocates for their communities a central, explicit feature
of their justice movements. For example, Charles Hamilton Houston reformed Howard Law School in the late 1920s from a modest trade school
into a training ground for what he called "social engineers" who would
steer the movement for justice for African Americans.36 Houston passed
between Howard and the stewardship of the NAACP, where he was the
group's first legal director.37 Through these efforts, he trained Thurgood
Marshall to be his successor at the helm of the NAACP Legal Defense
and Education Fund, and trained an entire generation of African American attorneys who became (and remain) leaders in this quest for legal
justice.
What is the history of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals at the bar?
At least three distinct periods can, preliminarily, be identified.
(1) Exclusion and Hiding-Pre-Stonewall

It is important to begin with the overlaps between the histories
sketched above: half of the individuals that comprise the lesbian/gay/bisexual community were excluded from the bar on the basis of
their gender, while other potential queer attorneys were denied opportunities because of their race or ethnic background. 39 Beyond these exclusions, members of the lesbian/gay community have faced exclusion from
the bar on the basis of their homosexuality itself. Bar associations police
applicants for moral character, 4° and through the mid-1980s, such
screenings were used to discourage lesbians and gay men from entering
the legal profession. Specifically, the moral character requirements were
means for excluding persons known to engage in same-sex conduct.41
35. Id.
36. See Charles H. Houston, The Need ForNegro Lawyers, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 49 (1935).
See generally GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983).
37. See MCNEIL, supra note 36, at 131.

38. See id.
39. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Characteras a Professional Credential, 94 YALE
L.J. 491, 500-01 (1985) (discussing how moral character requirements were used against influx
of Jewish attorneys in early 20th century).
40. See id. at 493 (reporting that as of 1985, every state bar association "makes certification of character a prerequisite for practice [of law]").
41. See id. at 580-81.
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While there are only a few reported decisions concerning denials of attorney licenses for reported homosexual behavior,42 anecdotal and statistical evidence supports the conclusion that the ramifications of these licensing schemes were more widespread.43 For example, in a 1991
demographic survey of the State Bar of California, 3.5% of the respondents under age forty identified themselves as gay, while only 2.2% of
those over forty did, and 4% of respondents with fewer than ten years of
legal practice were gay-identified, while only 2.1% of those with more
than ten years experience identified themselves as gay." Although these
differences may be attributable, in part, to an increasing "openness"
among younger attorneys, they also suggest the possibility that a larger
portion of gay people are coming to the bar now that sexuality is not policed so closely by moral character committees (or law firms). This
change developed slowly throughout the 1970s and 1980s, paralleling the
changes discussed in Part I. In her 1979 Hastings symposium article,
Rhonda Rivera reported that as long ago as 1976, an ABA poll of state
bar associations revealed that "[n]o state bar admitted seeking... information [about sexual preference] from an applicant. " 4s
Nonetheless, Deborah Rhode reported that even in the mid-1980s, an individual bar applicant's "sexual conduct or lifestyle" might still trigger a
bar investigation in nearly 40% of the states, although such an investigation would be unlikely to lead to a denial of admission.46 For example,
Rhode reports that "a 1981 applicant who had been excluded from military service on grounds of homosexuality submitted to an hour and a half

42. See Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re N.R.S., 403 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1981); State cc
rel. Fla. Bar v. Kimball, 96 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1957); In re Kimball, 33 N.Y.2d 586 (1973),
rev'g, 339 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1973). For an overview of the Kimball case, see ARTHUR
LEONARD, SEXUALITY AND THE LAW:

AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAJOR LEGAL CASES 389-92

(1993).
43. See Rhode, supra note 39, at 493-94 ("Although the number of applicants formally
denied admission [because of moral character requirements] has always been quite small, the
number deterred, delayed, or harassed, has been more substantial."); Rivera, supra note 9, at
857 n.349 (describing an investigation of an "avowed homosexual" by the Ohio State Bar in
1971).
44. See SRI INTERNATIONAL, 1991 DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY OF THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA: COMPARISONS OF GAY AND NON-GAY STATE BAR MEMBERS (1994) (prepared

for the Standing Committee on Sexual Orientation Discrimination, The State Bar of California).
45. Rivera, supra note 9, at 859.
46. See Rhode, supra note 39, at 532-33, 580-81.
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of 'every
tricky question about his sex life [examiners] could dream
47
of.'"

(2) Seeds of Change-1970s
Following the Stonewall riots in 1969 and the growth of the modem
phase of the lesbian/gay movement in the United States in the 1970s, lesbian and gay student groups began to form at law schools.4 8 As noted

above,4 9 the Hastings law student group was the plaintiff in a landmark
discrimination case against the local telephone company, one of the
state's largest employers.5 0
Simultaneously, newly emboldened lesbian/gay attorneys and their

supporters began to form lesbian/gay public interest law firms. In the
early 1970s, gay attorneys in New York City applied for a license to establish a public interest organization named Lambda Legal Defense &
Education Fund."1 Lambda was to provide legal services to lesbians and

gay men and to help educate gay people about their legal rights."2 An
intermediate appellate court denied Lambda's charter, declaring that its

purposes were neither "benevolent nor charitable.""

The New York

Court of Appeals reversed, ordering that Lambda be authorized to be-

come a public interest organization. 4 Even in obeying the high court's
order and granting Lambda's license, however, the intermediate court refused to approve Lambda's purpose of promoting "legal education among
homosexuals by recruiting and encouraging potential law students who
are homosexuals and by providing assistance to such students after ad-

47. Id. at 580-81 & n.422 (quoting Brookie, Florida CourtProhibitsBan on Gay Lawyers,
Gay Community News, Aug. 22, 1981, and citing Papke, The Watergate Lawyers All Passed

the Characterand Fitness Committee, 2 COLUM. U.F. 15, 19 (1973)).
48. For a more current rendering of the status of such groups, see Gene P. Schultz, The
Inclusion of Sexual Orientation in NondiscriminationPolicies: A Survey of American Law

Schools, 2 L. & SEXUALITY: REv. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL ISSUES 131 (1992). Schultz re-

ports on a survey sent to law schools throughout the 1980s which sought information about,
inter alia, the existence of lesbian/gay student groups. See id. at 132-33. In 1985, out of 151
law schools responding to his survey, 23 law schools (or 15%) reported the existence of such a
group. See id. at 134. In 1987, the number had grown to 37 of 153 respondents (24%). See
id. By 1990, the number was 56 of 158 (35%). See id.
49. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
50. See Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
51. See In re Thorn, 337 N.Y.S.2d 588, 589 (1972).

52. See id.
53. Id.
54.

See In re Thorn, 33 N.Y.2d 609 (1973).
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mission to law school."5 5 Throughout the 1970s, women's legal collectives, like that formed by Nancy Polikoff and Nan Hunter in Washington,
D.C., sprung up around the country and began litigating cases challenging gender norms and on behalf of lesbian rights.5 6 By the late 1970s,
Lambda was ensconced on the East Coast, and a group called Gay Rights
Advocates, formed by Hastings graduates Jerel McCrary and Matt Coles,
was active in the Bay Area." The Bay Area's Equal Rights Advocates
maintained a Lesbian Rights Project as of 1977 as well. 8
At the end of the 1970s, lesbian/gay/bisexual bar associations began
to form,59 with queer lawyers developing their own social and economic
networks in major cities throughout the United States.
(3) Rapid Change-1980sand 1990s
Within a decade, two remarkable and not unrelated events had transpired. First, hundreds, if not thousands, of gay attorneys succumbed to
HIV disease. Second, acceptance of openly gay attorneys had changed
rather significantly. AIDS had several dramatic effects on the bar beyond the deaths it inflicted. It essentially "outed" large numbers of gay
male attorneys at law firms throughout the United States. The visibility
of the effects of the illness made it impossible for these attorneys to remain (if they had been) closeted within their firms, and implausible for
their firms to continue to avert their gaze. If by the early 1980s large
segments of the bar were characterized by a "don't ask, don't tell" approach to homosexuality, AIDS undermined this strategy as to gay men
for both sides of the equation. AIDS ultimately enabled law firms to act
charitably towards their gay constituencies without acting too politically.
Firms began to donate money to "gay" causes (albeit for helping people
with HIV disease) and to undertake pro bono work on HIV-related cases.
For example, a watershed event in the New York legal community occurred in 1986 when three major law firms-Skadden, Arps, Slate,
55. In re Thorn, 350 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1973).
56. See Hunter & Polikoff, supra note 22, at 691-92.
57. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 10, at vii-viii.
58. See George Markell, New Judge, New Perspective/DonnaHitchens Says She Brings to
Bench a Respect for Diversity, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 1, 1991, at A4; Deb Price, Gay Legal Advocates, GANNET NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 16, 1991, availablein 1991 WL 5469451.
59. See Committee on Lesbians and Gay Men in the Legal Profession, Report on the Experience of Lesbians and Gay Men in the Legal Profession, 48 THE RECORD [OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK] 843, 845 & n.9 (1993) [hereinafter

Experience of Lesbians and Gay Men] (reporting that The New York Law Group, now the Lesbian and Gay Law Association of Greater New York, was formed in 1978).
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Meagher & Flom; Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz; and Phillips, Nizer,
Benjamin, Krim and Ballon-held a party (on the first anniversary of the
enactment of New York's gay fights law) in honor of former New York
Corporation Counsel F.A.O. Schwartz, Jr., that was simultaneously a
fundraising event for Lambda. 6° It was the first time that a major New
York law firm placed its imprimatur, however implicitly, on the gay bar.
To get a sense of the times, it is worth noting that although more than
300 people attended, newspaper photographers were not permitted to take
pictures freely at the party because "some participants feared that if their
presence became known, others would assume that they were homosexual." 61 Another impact of the HIV epidemic is that it made openly gay
people "authority figures" on a legal issue of critical importance.62 With
that authority, openly gay attorneys were consulted for advice by colleagues within and without the bar, asked to contribute to CLE programs,
and solicited for opinions by the media. This platform solidified the position of openly gay men and women within bar associations nationwide.
By the end of the decade, some large firms had adopted nondiscrimination policies (most are located in cities where discrimination is
banned anyway) and some had begun considering same-sex partner policies.' With significant impetus coming from the increasing number of
openly-gay law students and associates, these gains have been consolidated in the 1990s. In the 1980s, law schools began adopting policies
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and, in
1990, the Association of American Law Schools ("AALS") adopted a
policy that member schools not discriminate on this basis or allow their
facilities to be used by employment recruiters that would do so.' Typically, law firms that recruit at law schools must sign pledges that they
comply with these requirements. Thus, it is fair to assume that as of this
writing, nearly all medium-to-large size law firms in the United States
have signed such a pledge. An increasing number of firms also offer

60.

See E.R. Shipp, Concern Over AIDS Helps Rights Unit, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1987, at

43.
61. Id.
62. I am indebted to Arthur Leonard for maling this point clear to me.
63. See generally Arthur S. Leonard, Include Gays and Lesbians in Firm Survey, NAT'L.
L.J., May 14, 1990 (discussing non-discrimination policies adopted by Paul, Weiss, Rifldnd,
Wharton & Garrison; Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; and Morrison & Foerster).
64. See Schultz, supra note 48, at 140. The ABA also requires law schools to have such
policies as a condition of accreditation.
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same-sex partner benefits. 6' Institutionally, half-a-dozen bar associations
have undertaken studies of discrimination against gay attorneys.'
An
open lesbian, Deborah Batts, is a federal district court judge.67
Gay-oriented public interest law groups also expanded rapidly in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1986, the ACLU started a Lesbian and
Gay Rights Project at its national office, and, with affiliate offices around
the country, employs roughly ten people who work on gay and AIDSrelated legal work full-time.6 8 Most importantly, Lambda Legal Defense
& Education Fund grew (between 1985 and 1995) from a single-lawyer,
single-room office to a large, truly national, legal institution. As of this
writing, Lambda has offices in four cities (New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Atlanta) and employs more than a dozen full-time attorneys.6 9
In San Francisco, Gay Rights Advocates became the National Gay Rights
Advocates in the mid-1980s and then folded in 1991.70 The Lesbian
Rights Project of Equal Rights Advocates split off and became an independent legal organization, the National Center for Lesbian Rights. 7
Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD) is a thriving regional
New England presence, and the Servicemembers Legal Defense Network
provides legal support on queer military issues from its Washington,
D.C. office. Dwarfing all of these institutions is the vast number of lawyers throughout the country who work full-time at AIDS service organizations, legal services centers, and related groups providing legal services to people with HIV disease. An important related development
concerns the growth of solo practitioners and small law firms dedicated to
serving the lesbian/gay community. By the late 1970s, such attorneys
and firms started to dot the legal landscape, and by the late 1980s, they

65. See, e.g., Committee on Sexual Orientation Issues of the Bar Association of San Francisco, BASF Report on Employment Policiesfor Gay andLesbian Attorneys 45 (1996) (reporting
that 28% of 64 San Francisco law firms that responded to survey offered health benefits to partners of lesbian/gay employees).
66. These include the bar associations of the State of California; San Francisco; Los Angeles; New York; King County, Washington (Seattle); and Hennepin County, Minnesota (Minneapolis).
67. See Francis A. McMorris, Judge Batts is Bringing Diversity in New Way to the Federal Bench, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1994, at B16. See also Stephen Reinhardt, The Court and
the Closet: Why Should FederalJudges Have to Hide Homosexuality?, WASH. POST, Oct. 31,
1993, at C3.
68. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 10, at viii.
69. See id. See also Bettina Boxall, Hearts of the City Leading a Fight ForRights, L.A.
TIMEs, Jan. 15, 1997, at B2.
70. See Victoria Slind-Flor, NGRA Disbands, NAT'L L.J., June 3, 1991.
71. See Markell, supra note 58, at A4.
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had proliferated. Gay newspapers in most major American cities routinely contain advertisements from many sole practitioners or small firms.
An enormous amount of the day-to-day legal work of large segments of
the gay community is handled by these practitioners.
The growth of the gay bar is reflected in the growing number of local lesbian and gay bar associations and the expanding National Lesbian
and Gay Law Association. In 1988, the latter group held its first national
law conference, Lavender Law I, in San Francisco. Four biennial Lavender Law conferences have followed, each generally attracting hundreds
of practicing attorneys from throughout the United States. These conferences have provided opportunities for strategizing about lesbian/gay legal
rights. But they have also served a professional function, enabling members of the private bar to meet their counterparts throughout the country.
Typically, the conferences include workshops devoted to issues such as
being out in the law firm and developing lesbian/gay community practices. 72
Progress at the gay bar tracks the more general achievements of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals that I described earlier.7' This narrative
also, therefore, has a "half empty" aspect-as so many of you know too
well. Many law schools have no gay student organizations; some have
no openly gay students at all. Lesbian, gay, and bisexual law students
continue to struggle with questions about how open to be in searching for
jobs,74 and firm attorneys daily negotiate the relationship between their
private lives and professional existences.7 5 Indeed, whole job categories
remain unavailable to openly queer attorneys-jobs for government and
private employers in certain areas of the country, 76 jobs in the military

72. See, e.g., Lawyers Gather For Conference on Gay and Lesbian Issues, PORT.
OREGONIAN, Oct. 22, 1994, available in 1994 WL 4852009.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 7-28.
74. See, e.g., Special Committee on Lesbians and Gay Men in the Legal Profession, Report on the Experience of Lesbian and Gay Law Students in New York Metropolitan Area Law
Schools, 51 THE RECORD [OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK] 145

(1996). See also Scott N. Ihrig, Sexual Orientationin Law School: Experiences of Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Law Students, XIV L. & INEQUALITY:
PRACTICE 555 (1996).

A JOURNAL OF THEORY AND

75. The bar association bias studies cited above, see supra note 66 and accompanying text,
contain some statistical and extensive anecdotal evidence of these experiences. See, e.g., Experienceof Lesbians and Gay Men, supra note 59, at 843.
76.

See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (upholding

constitutionality of state attorney general's firing of lesbian attorney for having a religious marriage ceremony with her partner).
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throughout the country, etc. Moreover, attorneys continue to confront
homophobia regularly throughout the legal system.'
B. Identity
Part A's discussion of the gay bar rested on one fundamental assumption-that we shared a sense of what constituted a lesbian, gay, or
bisexual lawyer-and the discussion therein reported the history of such
persons at the bar. In this Part, I retreat to what might be considered a
prior question, namely: What does it mean when we refer to someone
(or a person identifies herself) as a lesbian, gay, or bisexual attorney?
When we refer to individuals as gay lawyers, what knowledge are we

transmitting about them? At least three sets of possibilities present themselves.

8

First, describing someone as a gay attorney could simply be an external description of what Sanford Levinson has called the intersection of
two sets 79 -gay people and attorneys. Despite the definitional problems

inherent in both "gay" and "attorney,""0 the phrase "gay attorney" is
nonetheless used often. Take the bar association bias studies discussed

above. Each of them employs the term "lesbian," "gay," or "bisexual"
lawyer, and a few of them acknowledge a definitional problem.8' But for
the proponents of these studies, the definitional problem does not impede

the work of the bias commissions from going forward. The terms employed have enough meaning to give meaning to their use in these con-

texts. Yet, the meaning of their use in these contexts is primarily one restricted to an "intersection of sets" approach.

When used in these

77. See, e.g., Special Committee on Lesbians and Gay Men in the Legal Profession, Report of Findingsfrom the Survey on Barriersand OpportunitiesRelated to Sexual Orientation,
51 THE RECORD [OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK] 130 (1996)
[hereinafter Barriersand Opportunities].
78. In examining this question in the context of "Jewish lawyers," Sanford Levinson developed five models. See Levinson, supra note 4, at 1583-84. In what follows, I borrow from
Levinson's analysis, as noted throughout, but reduce his models to three sets.
79. See id. at 1585.
80. Are lesbian attorneys those women who have "come out?" To whom? Or can you be
a lesbian attorney if your primary erotic inclination is to other women, though you are married
to a man? Like the category "Jewish," these sexual identity categories are contested sites.
Similarly, we could also argue (though perhaps less interestingly) about what it means to be a
"lawyer." For example, are law professors lawyers?
81. See, e.g., HENNEPIN COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION LESBIAN AND GAY ISSUES
SUBCOMMITrEE,

LEGAL EMPLOYERS'

BARRIERS TO ADVANCEMENT

EQUALITY BASED UPON SEXUAL ORIENTATION 2-3 (1995).

AND TO ECONOMIC
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studies, "gay lawyer" simply refers to someone who is a member of the
bar and who identifies as a lesbian, gay man, or bisexual. It is not a term
meant to convey any particular information about how the attorney's sexual orientation affects her practice of law, or how her professional identity affects her practice of homosexuality. (Though, obviously, the impetus for these bias studies is the suspicion that those at the intersection of
these sets share some experience(s) that are worth surveying and reporting on.) As Levinson writes, "It is at least conceivable that knowing that
a lawyer is Jewish would provide no more information about her behavior as a lawyer than knowing that her eyes were hazel," though Levinson
continues, "I suspect that most of us currently find it implausible to believe that being Jewish provides no useful information at all about lawyering."' Does being "gay" provide any useful information at all about
how such a person will "lawyer"?
A second set of definitional possibilities is that identifying someone
as a "gay" attorney suggests something about the manner in which they
will practice law. Thus, a lesbian or gay attorney could be defined as
someone who will be partial to lesbian and gay "causes,"83 or whose homosexuality will affect the way in which she practices law,' or perhaps
82. Levinson, supra note 4, at 1586.
83. Neither Supreme Court Justices Frankfurter nor Brandeis, Levinson reminds us, were
practicing Jews, though both are regarded as Jewish Justices. "What counts for much of the
Jewish identification of Brandeis and Frankfurter is their strong commitment... to Zionism as
a solidaristic expression of Jewish communal interests." Id. at 1590. Thus, by referring to
someone as a gay attorney, perhaps we are making a comment about his or her commitment to
gay communal interests. But it would seem odd to disanchor the notion of gay identity from
sexual practices. Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe argued two major Supreme Court
cases for the lesbian and gay community in the 1980s (National Gay Task Force v. Board of
Educ. of Okla. City, 470 U.S. 903 (1985) and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)), and
authored a critical amicus brief in the case in which the Supreme Court declared that the equal
protection clause polices anti-gay discrimination (Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)).
Yet few would claim that Tribe, who is married to a woman, is a "gay attorney." More likely,
he would be seen as a "gay rights advocate." Thus, commitment to gay causes is probably
neither sufficient, nor perhaps necessary, to make one a "gay attorney."
84. Levinson proposes an example for this model in which an Orthodox lawyer is asked to
represent a Jew in a dispute with another Jewish person in a secular court. Non-Jewish lawyers, and even non-religious Jewish lawyers, would probably be untroubled by the representation, but the Orthodox lawyer would be aware that "some rabbis have ruled that" Jewish law
"prohibits a Jewish lawyer from representing a Jewish plaintiff in a civil suit [against another
Jew] before a secular court." Levinson, supranote 4, at 1603 (citing Dov Bressler, Arbitration
and the Courts in Jewish Law, 9 J. HALACHA & CONTEmP. SoC'Y 105, 112 (1985)). In this
example, "the very way that a lawyer relates to his clients seems to be affected crucially by the
lawyer's self-conception as a Jew." Id. at 1604.
Is there anything "essential" about being lesbian/gay/bisexual, or something essential about
our experiences in these identities in modern America, that provides some unique relationship to
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one who will sublimate her professional responsibilities to her queer
identity.85 In each of these possibilities, the identification of the attorney
as a "gay" attorney conveys information about how we might expect that

attorney to act.
A third type of definition concerning what it might mean to say that
one is a "gay attorney" links us to Wilkins' obligation thesis. Rather
than seeing "gay attorney" as merely an external intersection of sets, and
rather than considering it as a prediction of an individual's professional
conduct, what if we instead read into such an identification a set of ideas
about how that person ought to act? This third definition of "gay attorney" maintains that occupying the identity category "gay"-and here

particularly the category of "gay lawyer"-entails a certain concomitant
set of obligations.

Thus, when an individual identifies as, or is fairly

identified as, a "gay attorney," this is more than a mere description of
her, but less than an adequate predictor of her future actions.

What it

can be a placeholder for, in this vision, is a set of responsibilities that result from her embrace (however tenuous) of, or her occupying (and/or
taking advantage of the benefits) of, this identity position. This is the ar-

gument I turn to in Part III.B.2. This links the identity of the queer atlawyering? Again a slight alteration on the Jewish analogy is necessary. There is no "law" of
the gay community that parallels Jewish law and that could place conflicting burdens on a practicing attorney. Nonetheless, there are norms-though fairly unarticulated, as I argue below,
see infra Part II.B.2-that might do so. A central, perhaps the central, norm of the gay community is the obligation that an individual not reveal another individual's gay sexual identity to
someone outside the community without her consent or knowledge. See, e.g., Richard Mohr,
The Outing Controversy: Privacy and Dignity in Gay Ethics, in GAY IDEAS: OUTING AND
OTHER CONTROVERSIES 11, 27-28 (1992) ("[S]ecrecy about the closet is a code within the gay
community as a whole. . . . And this presumption is firmly entrenched in gay social custom.... Now, this code of silence and presumption of the closet is not just a rule. It is an
industrial strength rule."). Two examples might link this quality of gay identity to lawyering.
First, a central norm of the legal profession is the requirement that lawyers keep client confidences. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.6 (1995). Might gay
lawyers, precisely because of their "gay-ness," be better situated to comply with this ethical
norm? (I am indebted to Martha Minow for helping me to see this connection.) Second, what
if a client's case could be furthered by "outing" a third party-will the gay attorney's loyalty be
to her client or to her communal norm?
85. "While one is on the job, does one's identity as a Jew in any significant sense shape
one's sense of what it means to practice law?" Levinson, supra note 4, at 1596. Levinson's
paradigmatic example is that of a Jewish baseball pitcher, Sandy Koufax, who famously refused
to pitch in an important game because it fell on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. We might
similarly select from the intersection of sets category, a subset of persons who "will subordinate
[their] identity as 'lawyer' to that of ['gay.']" Id. at 1594. For example, what if "coming out"
to a judge before whom an attorney has a case pending risks triggering a negative reaction by
that judge? Does the queer attorney thereby have an obligation (to her client) to not come out?
If so, can a gay attorney ever safely bring her partner to a judicial conference?
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torney not to a set of political positions but to a set of community responsibilities.
Thus, in response to the question, "What does it mean to be a les-

bian, gay, or bisexual (corporate) attorney?", I would tentatively propose
this response: It means that you have certain responsibilities to the lesbian, gay, and bisexual communities. What follows are the reasons why.

MI.

The Obligation Thesis

There are four key elements to David Wilkins' argument:16 (1) the
empirical and (2) ethical bases of his proposal for "the obligation thesis";

(3) the content of the "obligation"; and (4) responses to proposed criticism. I will consider each element in a separate subsection and, within
each subsection, consider that element's application to the queer community.
A.

The Empirical Basis of the Obligation Thesis

(1) The Paradoxof the Black CorporateAttorney

Wilkins begins by describing a paradox of corporate lawyering-that
this newly available opportunity for black attorneys could simultaneously
lead them to undertake tasks at odds with their community's interests.8 7

86. A primary element of Wilkins' work that I do not tackle in this Essay is his attempt to
link his thesis to proposed changes in the law school curricula. Though he has written about the
obligation thesis in a variety of fora, Wilkins' seminal piece is that cited in note 1, supra. Wilkins elaborates on aspects of the obligation thesis in David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and The
FirstAmendment: Should A Black Lawyer Represent The Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1030 (1995) [hereinafter Wilkins, Klan?] and David B. Wilkins, Social Engineers or
Corporate Tools? Brown v. Board of Education and the Conscience of the Black Corporate
Bar, in RACE, LAW, AND CULTURE: REFLECTIONS ON BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
137, 139-42 (Austin Sarat ed., 1997) [hereinafter Wilkins, Social Engineers]. See also David
B. Wilkins, Straightfacketing Professionalism: A Comment on Russell, 95 MICH. L. REv. 795
(1997); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Guati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493 (1996); David B. Wilkins,
Presumed Crazy: The Structure of Argument in the Hill/Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REv.
1517 (1992).
87. See Wilkins, supra note 1, at 1986-92.
[C]haracteristics of corporate law practice suggest that there is a danger that black
lawyers who choose to work in this area will fail to contribute to the struggle to end
the unjustified inequalities between blacks and whites, and may indirectly or directly
help perpetuate them.... [T]he more blacks take advantage of these new opportunities, the more they may find themselves separated from, and perhaps even opposed to,
the demands of other blacks for substantive justice.
Id. at 1990.
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Specifically, Wilkins worries that lawyers for corporations "help to entrench the current overall distribution of wealth and power in American
society," where blacks are "at or near the bottom of this distribution."88
And beyond this general harm, Wilkins contends that "on a growing
number of issues, the practices of certain large corporations and
the... articulated concerns of the black community will be directly opposed." 89 While one might conclude that black attorneys should therefore
abandon the field of corporate law, Wilkins does not." Rather, he carefully outlines the "social justice benefits" of blacks practicing corporate
law to demonstrate that forsaking corporate practice is not only an implausible alternative, but arguably a foolish one as well. 9 These benefits
include the fact that blacks in elite jobs undermine stereotypes of intellectual inferiority, can serve as role models for younger blacks generally,
can provide access to resources that can be directed to the black community, can more easily move into political careers or influence political
outcomes, and can influence corporations themselves to act in ways less
harmful to the black community. 92 In place of abdication of the field,
Wilkins proposes the "obligation thesis" as a "way out" of his paradox:
"By positing that successful blacks have a duty to consider the interests of
other blacks when performing their new roles, proponents of [the obligation] thesis seek to ensure that the progress of individual blacks will not
unduly impede the advancements of the black community as a whole."'
(2) The Paradoxof the Queer CorporateAttorney

Like black attorneys (regardless of their sexual orientation), lesbian,
gay, and bisexual attorneys (regardless of their gender, race, or ethnlicity)
have available to them a wider range of professional opportunities than
they ever had in the past. Being "out" no longer automatically precludes
entry to the elite ranks of corporate practice, much less to the bar itself.
Some corporate firms specifically recruit openly gay attorneys, while
many strive to provide a non-hostile working environment through implementation of non-discrimination policies and, in some cases, domestic

88. Id. at 1989.
89. Id. at 1990 (noting examples involving employment discrimination and environmental
and consumer issues).

90. See id. at 1990-92.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 1991.
93. Id. at 1992-93.
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partnership plans.' There is little doubt that corporate firms are more
accessible to openly gay attorneys than at any time in the past, and that
this trend will only continue.
Does the practice of corporate law have potential negative consequences for the lesbian, gay, and bisexual community similar to those
Wilkins argues it may have for the black community? Probably. For the
reasons that follow, it is fair to assume that lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals generally do not find themselves "at or near the bottom" of the
distribution of wealth and power in America to the same extent that African Americans generally do. While some lesbians and gay men are located "at the bottom," and those who are also people of color and women
may find themselves multiply oppressed in the economic and political hierarchy,' homosexual desire is more or less evenly disbursed throughout
the socio-economic continuum.6 This would seem probable since most
gay persons are not raised in gay families and thus the generation-aftergeneration entrenchment of poverty that, for example, blacks have faced
does not operate in the same way for non-African American lesbians, gay
men, and bisexuals. Nonetheless, a significant portion of the lesbian,
gay, and bisexual community is not among the privileged classes, and because homophobia does have economic impacts across the board, 97 it is
fair to argue that redistribution of existing economic patterns would generally benefit the larger lesbian, gay, and bisexual community. Moreover, corporations have resisted, and will continue to resist, what many
believe are central goals of gay liberation, ranging from fair treatment of
gay employees to the provision of benefits to same-sex partners. 98 Accordingly, there does exist a strong risk that the increasing number of
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals in corporate law practice may find

94. See supra Part II.

95. See Lee Badgett, The Wage Effects of Sexual OrientationDiscrimination,48 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 726, 737 (1995) (reporting that bisexual and gay male workers earned between
11-27% less money than comparable heterosexual workers) [hereinafter Badgett, Wage Effects];
M.V. LEE BADGErT, ECONOMIC EVIDENCE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION (1994)
[hereinafter BADGaET, ECONOMIC EVIDENCE].
96. See generally HOMO ECONOMICS: CAPITALISM, COMMUNITY, AND LESBIAN AND

GAY LIFE (Amy Gluckman & Betsy Reed eds., 1997).
97. See Badgett, Wage Effects, supra note 95, at 737. See generally BADGETT,
ECONOMIC EVIDENCE, supra note 95.
98. One recent example of this phenomenon is the fact that many large corporations withdrew their advertising from the episode of the television series "Ellen" in which the show's
main character came out of the closet. See, e.g., Susan Reimer, Don't Wory About Ellen-Do
Worry About TV, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 27, 1997, at 1.
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themselves in positions potentially harmful to their community's interests.
Thus, we might argue that gay people should avoid corporate practice.
But the social benefits that accrue to the gay community when gay
individuals pursue such careers match the benefits that accrue to the black
community in Wilkins' piece. Openly gay individuals in elite jobs undermine stereotypes about gay people, for instance that lesbians and gay
men are not trustworthy.' Openly gay persons in corporate firms may
also challenge stereotypes about gender roles, e.g., that gay men are "not
tough enough" to be successful litigators or lesbians are "too tough" to
succeed in the politics of corporate culture. 1' ° Successful gay corporate
attorneys can serve as role models for younger lesbians, gay men, and
bisexuals. Not only can they provide access to resources that can be directed to the gay community, they can more easily move into political careers or influence political outcomes, and can motivate corporations
themselves to act in ways less harmful to the gay community. In pro
bono matters, corporate attorneys can mobilize both the prestige and the
tremendous resources of their law firms, lending credibility (in the eyes
of courts) and enormous financial assistance to lawsuits brought to better
the societal situation of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals.
Thus, on this empirical level, Wilkins' call for an "obligation thesis"
as a away out" of the paradox of expanded opportunities fits: By positing
that successful gay people have a duty to consider the interests of other
gay people when performing their new roles, proponents of the obligation
thesis seek to ensure that the progress of the individual lesbians, gay
men, and bisexuals will not unduly impede the advancements of the gay
community as a whole.'0 1

99. See, e.g., Barriersand Opportunities, supra note 77, at 138 ("Judge X has made it
clear that he finds homosexuals to be the most unreliable witnesses."); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUsT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 162 (1980) ("Our stereotypeswhether to the effect that male homosexuals are effeminate, females 'butch'; that they are untrustworthy, unusually menacing to children, or whatever-are likely to remain fixed, given our
obliviousness to the fact that the people around us may well be counterexamples.") (emphasis
added).
100. Cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 229 (1989) (holding that denial of partnership in large national accounting firm to woman who was judged not feminine enough by her
male colleagues constituted sex discrimination).
101. See Wilkins, supra note 1, at 1992-93 ("By positing that successful blacks have a duty
to consider the interests of other blacks when performing their new roles, proponents of this
thesis seek to ensure that the progress of the individual blacks will not unduly impede the advancement of the black community as a whole.").
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The Moral Basis of the Obligation Thesis

(1) Wilkins' Morality
The fact that individual black corporate attorneys might be able simultaneously to pursue their careers and help the black community hardly
means that they are morally obliged to do so. Accordingly, Wilkins must
define the moral basis of his obligation thesis. In so doing, he again relies heavily on social observation."°e In particular, he identifies the basis
of his moral theory in two aspects of the reality of black life in America
today-first, that "the bonds of solidarity and community with other
blacks constitute an important source of strength," and second, that "regardless of whether one values the bonds of racial solidarity, the actions
of individual blacks and the well-being of the black community are inextricably linked." 3 Taken together, Wilkins argues, "these two consequences of contemporary race consciousness provide a moral foundation
for the claim that black professionals have obligations running to other
° The moral foundation
blacks."'O
Wilkins builds has three main components: self-interest (that blacks taking responsibility for other blacks will
build "a healthy self-love"), reciprocity (that taking responsibility repays
a debt all blacks owe to the larger black community), and externality (that
no black person can undertake a purely "individual" act in our society so
that each must be conscious of the consequences of her actions on the

community). 05
(2) Queer Morality
Contemporary sexual politics provide the basis for similar claims for
gay attorneys. First, for most lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals-certainly for openly gay persons-the bonds of solidarity and community
provide a critical source of strength within contemporary American society. Second, the actions of individual (openly) gay persons and the wellbeing of the gay community generally are inextricably interwoven. A
102. See id. at 1997-2002.
103. Id. at 1999-2000.
104. Id. at 2001.

105. See id. at 2001-02. See also Wilkins, Klan?, supra note 86, at 1043 ("Although [a
black lawyer's] racial identity does not define him, his moral, economic, and spiritual connection to the black community does have an important moral claim on his decisions, at least when
those decisions are likely to have predictable consequences for other blacks."). Later in his
seminal piece, Wilkins alludes to "privilege" as another source of obligation. See Wilkins, supra note 1, at 2009-10.
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lesbian attorney at a corporate law firm, whether she likes it or not, "rep-

resents" her community to those at the firm, as well as to clients, adversaries, the bench, and the bar.

Three specific aspects of (queer) communal life bolster the leap from
these empirical observations to the claim of moral obligation. The
strongest and first basis of the obligation lies in the specific principle of

reciprocity. Put simply, there is not a single gay person in America who
has not taken advantage of certain aspects of the gay community that oth-

ers have sacrificed to provide. Anyone who has, for instance, gone to a
gay bar, felt emboldened by a pride parade, read a gay newspaper, had
sex with another person of the same sex without fearing arrest, or spoken
openly about being gay to another person, has reaped the benefits of batties fought by others.

The reciprocity principle insists that those who

take out must also put back in.
The second ethical basis of the obligation thesis is the privilege principle. Lesbian and gay corporate attorneys are at the privileged end of

the community spectrum. This is not, of course, universally true, but it
is more true than not. The privileges that are enjoyed-a fair degree of
financial security, power and autonomy in many spheres of life, and access to it in many others-come with their responsibilities.

When we

think of ourselves as "gay," it is important that we think not only of how
occupying that identity makes us victims deserving of "rights," but also
of the many ways we are not victims-and that we link the privileged as3
pects of our particular social situations to a set of "responsibilities.""°

106. This argument is strengthened by the fact that the bar itself recognizes certain responsibilities that flow from the privilege of being admitted to a profession that controls a scarce,
yet crucial, social resource. See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,
Comment to Rule 6.1 (1994) ("Every lawyer... has a responsibility to provide legal services
to those unable to pay."); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-25 (1983)
("The rendition of free legal services to those unable to pay reasonable fees continues to be an
obligation of each lawyer."); Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Southern Dist. of Iowa,
490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989) ("[l]n a time when the need for legal services among the poor is
growing and public funding for such services has not kept pace, lawyers' ethical obligation to
volunteer their time and skills pro bono publico is manifest."). See generally Michael Millemann, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: A PartialAnswer to the Right Question, 49 MD. L.
REV. 18, 33-35 (1990); David Luban, Mandatory Pro Bon: A Workable (andMoral) Plan, 64
MICH. BAR J. 280-83 (1985). While the bar's norm is aspirational, not mandatory, see RHODE
& LUBAN, supra note 31, at 791; Mallard, 490 U.S. at 300-08 (holding that 28 U.S.C.
§1915(d) does not create a mandatory service requirement), courts have nonetheless rejected the
argument that forcing an attorney to provide representation to the indigent is unconstitutional:
An applicant for admission to practice law may justly be deemed to be aware of the
traditions of the profession which he is joining, and to know that one of these traditions is that a lawyer is an officer of the court obligated to represent indigents for lit-
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Finally, it is important to emphasize the "if not us" principle. Hillel's query-"If I am not for myself, who will be?" 1 7-applies communally. If lesbian, gay, and bisexual corporate attorneys have taken from
the community and enjoy a privileged opportunity to return the favor, and
do not do so, how can they expect that anyone else will? It is a fair assumption that absent action by gay people, few heterosexuals will involve

themselves in the effort to combat homophobia.' 8 Thus, for example,
the work of lesbian, gay, and bisexual attorneys typically is the catalyst
that prods law firms to adopt non-discrimination and same-sex partner
policies."° Moreover, the negative effects of corporate practice on queer
citizens will probably not be policed carefully by the straight bar absent
vigilance by the gay bar. Indeed, an openly gay attorney willing to provide legal assistance in anti-gay activities-say, in defending a corporation that has discriminated against gay employees-provides precisely the

excuse for inaction that non-gay people may welcome. If we are not for
ourselves, we cannot realistically expect others to be for us.

Given these compelling moral bases for intra-community obligations,
it is surprising how feeble a discourse exists within the lesbian and gay
communities about our obligations towards one another and about the
tie or no compensation upon court order. Thus, the lawyer has consented to, and assumed, this obligation.
United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965). But see David L. Shapiro, The
Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 735 (1980) (arguing against a requirement of pro bono service, including consideration of possible unconstitutionality).
Thus, while gay corporate attorneys may have moral obligations to their communities that
flow from their privileged financial and social status, they may also possess moral obligations
by virtue of the privilege society grants to them through their attorneys' license.
107. The Tractate Avot (Ethics of Our Fathers), reprinted in THE TALMUD: SELECTED
WRITINGS 221 (Ben Zion Bokser trans., 1989). Hillel's related query-"If I am for myself
alone, what am I?"-is no less important in this context. See infra Part III.D.2.
108. One of the primary problems with the obligation thesis is that it can be read to relieve
those not connected to a particular identity from responding to the oppression of that identity.
Yet arguably, these are the people who have the most responsibility for the oppression and
should shoulder the greatest burden in responding to it. In Part IV, I consider such objections,
see, e.g., infra note 144, but would here simply note that (1) the obligations of non-gay persons
to address heterosexism derive from different moral sources than those discussed here and thus
require their own analyses beyond the scope of this Essay; (2) in the meantime, the obligation
thesis set forth here should not be read to relieve non-gay persons of their obligations; and critically, (3) regardless of the source of the moral obligations of non-gay persons, or of their responses to those obligations, experience teaches that Hillel's principle ("If I am not for myself")
is worth heeding.
109. For an interesting analysis of how the presence of openly gay faculty positively affects
law school sexual orientation policies, see Steven Hartwell, Wat a Difference a Gay Makes:
An Empirical Study of the Impact of 'Out' Gay Law Faculty on Law School Curriculum and
Policies, 1 NAT'LJ. SEX. ORIENT. L. 227 (1995).
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content of these obligations. Wilkins easily rests his obligation thesis
upon a long tradition of community service within the African American
community.10 While a rich history of service between and among lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals exists, little explicit discussion of this history-much less of any moral basis for it-occurs. Two exceptional loci
of discussion about intra-gay community obligations1 are the discourses
of outing

12

and of HIV transmission."' Outing is about intra-community

obligations because what is at stake in an "outing" is the breaking of a
shared norm, namely the rule that information about a person's sexual
orientation will not be revealed to those outside the lesbian, gay, or bisexual community. 1 4 What is interesting about the outing discourse,
however, is that the norm being violated had never truly been estab-

lished-the non-outing principle has always been nothing more than an
unwritten and oft-violated code among lesbians, gay men, and bisexu-

als." 5 It nonetheless is terrifically powerful, as the sturm und drang
about outing within our community demonstrates. The transmission of
HIV among men having sex with other men has led to the development of
voluminous public health literature about how such men "ought" to behave, about, that is, their obligations towards one another.11 6 Yet, as
110. See Wilkins, supra note 1, at 1984 & n.13.
111. A third is the literature about lesbian communities, both lesbian separatist literature
from the 1970s and the growing body of lesbian "ethics" that characterizes some philosophical
circles in the 1990s. Despite these explicit discussions of communities, community building,
and culture, there are few discussions about obligation norms among women within lesbian
communities. Claudia Card, in gesturing towards a study of lesbian "norms and values" suggests that lesbians have often been "reluctant to use the language of 'ought,' 'must' and
'should,'" though Card concedes that lesbians "have nevertheless frequently developed flexible
norms and standards of evaluation." CLAUDIA CARD, LESBIAN CHOICES 14 (1995). Still,
other than her volume's discussion of the ethics of outing, see id. at Chapter 10 ("Other People's Secrets: The Ethics of Outing"), there is no discernable emphasis on rule-like norms of
obligation within her vision of lesbian culture, perhaps for the reasons to which she alludes.
112. See generally LARRY GROSS, CONTESTED CLOSETS: THE POLITICS AND ETHICS OF
OUTING (1993).
113. For an explicit indictment of many gay community leaders for the absence of any intra-community responsibility during the early years of the AIDS epidemic, see RANDY SHILTS,
AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC (1987). See also
Larry Kramer, 1,112 and Counting, 59 N.Y. NATIVE (Mar. 14-27, 1983), reprintedin LARRY
KRAMER, REPORTS FROM THE HOLOCAUST: THE MAKING OF AN AIDS ACTIvIST 33-51
(1990). See generally RONALD BAYER, PRIvATE ACTS, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES: AIDS AND
THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC HEALTH (1989).
114. See, e.g., Mohr, supra note 84, at 27-28.
115. Two exceptions in which the norm is discussed more fully are Mohr, supra note 114,
and CARD, supra note 111, at Chapter 10.
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many have pointed out," 7 this discourse is most remarkable for the ab-

sence of articulated responsibility for anything other than one's own
health; it is permeated throughout by the pre-existing libertarian discourse

of gay male sexuality. Only recently, and importantly, have some writers
broken the taboo and begun to emphasize the responsibilities that gay

men, particularly those infected with HIV, ought to take for one another's well being.

Gabriel Rotello's recent book, Sexual Ecology, is

notable in this regard because Rotello argues for such a position from the
moral viewpoint of one's "community" obligations.1 8 What is particularly stunning here is that the non-outing responsibility, so little dis-

cussed, is taken so seriously, while the far more portentous responsibility
of practicing safe-sex is taken, at the level of moral obligation, far less
seriously. The opportunities for the "obligation thesis" to circulate
widely among queer attorneys is limited by this dearth of extant discourse
within the community about obligations generally.

The fact that gay people are almost never raised in gay families presents an additional obstacle to the consideration of how obligations are

generated and circulated within queer communities. Traditions of community service and obligation are the types of norms that are typically in-

stilled within the family environment during the maturation process. For
gay people, this will not happen vis-A-vis their homosexuality.119 Accordingly, lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals need to be more pro-active,
and perhaps more heavy-handed, in "passing down" these traditions to
young adults (and others) during the "coming out" process, and in re116.

For an interesting overview, see National Research Council, Public Policies on Chil-

dren and Families, in SOCIAL IMPACT OF AIDS IN THE U.S. 201, 219-36 (Albert R. Jonsen &
Jeff Stryker eds., 1993).
117. See supra note 113.
118. See GABRIEL ROTELLO, SEXUAL ECOLOGY: AIDS AND THE DESTINY OF GAY MEN
(1997). See also MICHELANGELO SIGNORILE, LIFE OuTSIDE: THE SIGNORILE REPORT ON
GAY MEN: SEX, DRUGS, MUSCLES, AND THE PASSAGES OF LIFE (1997). Needless to say,
these works have produced controversy within the gay community. For an example of the
negative reaction, see Mark Schoofs, The Law of Desire, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 15, 1997,
at 52. On the debate generally, see M.A.J. McKenna, In The Age of AIDS, ATLANTA J. &
ATLANTA CONST., July 29, 1997, at Fl, availablein 1997 WL 3983726.
119. Of course, many lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals will be raised in families that will
inculcate other traditions of service, such as those based on religious heritage, racial communities, ethnic pride, etc. The gay person's obligations to her gay communities may thus merely
supplement pre-existing obligations with differing moral bases and content. See supra note 5.
All sorts of interesting questions are implicated by these multi-obligations: Is a Jewish person's
sense of community obligation fulfilled through legal work on behalf of lesbians and gay men?
Would one's obligation to the lesbian, gay, bisexual community be fulfilled through environmental activism?

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[V/ol. 48

articulating such traditions more regularly. 1" For aspiring lesbian, gay,
and bisexual attorneys, law school might be a place (and will often be the
age) at which such obligations are first considered seriously. In this
sense, law schools may well function, formally or informally, as sites of
inscription for communal obligations."'
C. The Content of the Obligation
(1) Wilkins' Content
Having established the context for the obligation thesis and the moral
basis for it, Wilkins turns to considering what it would mean for any attorney to fulfill it. What does it mean to undertake work on behalf of the
black community? How much is enough? While it might seem easy to
agree that a case like Brown v. Board of Education" was inarguably in
the interests of the black community, other examples might not produce
such consensus."
Individual members of the black community might
disagree vehemently about whether a particular action serves or undermines the community's interests.
Wilkins considers and rejects the argument that the black community's "interests" are unknowable or that individual actions could not be
normatively assessed: "Just because choosing between competing philosophies about how to advance the interests of the black community involves normative and empirical judgments does not mean that there are
no standards by which such a choice can be made." 124 Wilkins proposes
two specific standards to determine whether a professional's activities
live up to her communal obligations: whether the actions promote
"antiracism" and/or whether they fulfill Rawls' "difference principle." 1"
120. This is an especially compelling task because the larger culture is intent on erasing
those traces of lesbian and gay life that do exist. See generally George Chauncey, Jr., et al.,
Introduction, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMING THE GAY AND LESBIAN PAST 1-13
(1989).
121. See Wilkins, supranote 1, and text accompanying notes 1-3.
122. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
123. Of course, there was even dispute within black communities throughout the United
States about the wisdom of the school desegregation cases themselves. Compare, e.g., W.E.
Burghardt Du Bois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328 (1935)

with, e.g., Chas. H. Thompson, CourtAction the Only ReasonableAlternative to Remedy Immediate Abuses of the Negro Separate School, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 419 (1935).
124. Wilkins, supra note 1, at 2011.
125. Id. at 2011. Rawls' "difference principle" holds that inequalities in the distribution of
economic or social goods are defensible only to the extent that their existence benefits everyone
in society. See JOHN RAWLS, THE THEORY OF JUSTICE 61 (1971).
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Wilkins argues that "these broad principles begin to provide a framework
for evaluating the claim that a given project is in the 'interests' of the
black community."" While Wilkins' original "obligation thesis" piece
provided few concrete examples and did not consider tough counterexamples in depth, his later work provides more thinking on the subject. In
particular, Wilkins' extended discussion of a black attorney's representation of the Ku Klux Klan in a First Amendment case127 puts meat on the
bones of his "framework for evaluating the claim that a given project is
in the 'interest' of the black community."" Therein, Wilkins challenges
the attorney's arguments that his actions (on behalf of the Klan's First
Amendment rights) were ultimately in the best interests of the black
community. 29 Wilkins sets forth the counterargument, demonstrating (at
least) that one could take the position that the attorney's Klan representation actually harmed the community. 3 ' Before rendering final judgment
againstthe attorney's actions, however, Wilkins grants him the integrity
of his strongly-held position, and ultimately states that "it
is... reasonable for him to believe that taking this action is not ruled
out-of-bounds by his countervailing obligation to advance the cause of racial justice,""' particularly because of the attorney's long-standing dedication to racial justice. 3
Though meant to provide an example of how the obligation thesis
could yield a coherent content, Wilkins' later work could be read to provide just as much support for the counterargument-that any action (even
representing the Klan) is ultimately defensible and thus that it is impossible to provide a coherent definition of what the obligation thesis entails.
A different approach, and one I sketch in what follows, would be to
abandon the attempt to give substantive content to the obligation thesis
and to resort to a "proceduralist" approach, one that emphasizes an attor-

126. Wilkins, supra note 1, at 2011.
127. See Wilkins, Klan?, supra note 86, at 1043-53.
128. Wilkins, supra note 1, at 2011. It is worth noting that the lawyer at issue in the Klan
case was not an attorney at a corporate firm, and, further, that the attorney's normal practice of
race discrimination law figures into Wilkins' conclusions about the morality of his actions. See
Wilkins, Klan?, supra note 86, at 1059-60. This contextualization uggests that a black corporate attorney undertaking similar work on behalf of the Klan would not be excused to the same
(limited) extent Wilkins is willing to pardon the civil rights practitioner.
129. See Wilkins, Klan?, supra note 86, at 1033.
130. See id., passim.
131. Id. at 1059. See also id. at 1061 (describing attorney's position as "plausible even if it
is not fully persuasive").
132. See id. at 1059-60.
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ney's obligation to engage in a process of deliberation about her obligations, regardless of the substantive position that such a process ultimately
produces. The value of this approach is implicit in Wilkins' work, as he
emphasizes the importance of race-consciousness 33 and acknowledges
and appreciates the Klan attorney's self-consciousness about his ac-

tions.

34

Yet Wilkins ultimately seems unwilling to defend a strictly pro-

ceduralist approach, perhaps because it appears to abdicate tough substantive, moral decisionmaking. In what follows, I will attempt a weak

defense of that approach, though I, too, am cognizant of its limitations.
(2) The Content of the Queer Obligation

What would the content of a queer obligation thesis be-what would
it mean to do something for queer equality or liberation? As above, my
response in defining the content of the obligation thesis is more procedural and pluralistic than I believe Wilkins' approach to be. The obligation thesis ought to operate, on the individuals covered by it, as a stimulus for community involvement.1 35 Thus, I would argue that an individual

corporate attorney is living up to her community obligations if she is engaged with her community in some meaningful way, so long as her engagement is not doing immediate concrete harm to the interests of that

community.
Engagement. Engagement can come in any number of ways. The
most obvious sense of engagement for lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals
133. See id. at 1042-43 ("[R]ace is an integral part of this story. [The black attorney] is
therefore accountable for giving these [moral obligation] considerations their proper weight
when making the discretionary choice to represent the Klan.").
134. Specifically, Wilkins speaks of the attorney's "integrity," by which he means "an individual's efforts to harmonize his or her diverse commitments into a meaningful life plan and
to act, so far as possible, in accordance with the actual requirements of that plan." Id. at 1058.
135. In this sense, the obligation thesis, and discussion of it, itself provides an incentive for
individuals to do good. Those writing from an economic perspective might criticize this entire
endeavor by asking what possible incentive individual corporate attorneys have to act beyond
their own self-interest. One response would be to couch my arguments in terms of self-interest,
namely to argue that the corporate attorneys are, ultimately, the beneficiaries of the actions they
might take to fulfill their obligations to their communities, either because of the community
gains or because of the individual satisfaction that follows from these actions. Cf. ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Comment to Rule 6.1 (1994) ("[P]ersonal involvement in
the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a
lawyer."). This could be true even accounting for the potential burdens such actions might entail. Another response, though, would be to acknowledge that the obligation thesis requires
individual corporate attorneys to act against self-interest to make sacrifices for their community.
In this vision, the whole point of the obligation thesis is to provide the moral argument, and
perhaps the rhetorical jolt, that might spur them to do so.
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at corporate firms is to say that these individuals have an obligation to
"come out." Such acts of self-identification have obvious political consequences because they undermine the forced invisibility of gay persons
that is demanded through norms like "don't ask, don't tell." While
coming out is usually helpful to the interests of gay communities, in and
of itself, it is often not a sufficient response to the obligation thesis.
Coming out may serve certain obligations: it may help change hearts and
minds in the immediate vicinity of the individual, and it may take enormous courage on the part of the individual. But focusing on coming out
alone runs the risk of setting too low a threshold. In many cases, it may
take more than publicly identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual for an individual to satisfy her obligations of reciprocity, privilege, and selfinterest. Coming out may be a necessary prerequisite to meaningful action-though even here I believe there are exceptional circumstances 136 but possibly not sufficient. Lesbian, gay, and bisexual corporate attorneys should consider whether, in their cases, coming out is itself a sufficient act to satisfy one's obligation to the larger community. In so doing,
queer corporate attorneys might consider more explicitly political acts.
Four sets of such actions jump immediately to mind.
First, queer corporate attorneys should provide legal services to
members of the lesbian, gay, and bisexual communities. There are a
number of ways to do so, from looking for queer legal business, to undertaking pro bono work on behalf of the community, to volunteering at
legal service centers within the community. Lawyers and legal workers
have a monopoly on the provision of the legal services that all members
of our communities need. To help a lesbian through a divorce or to assist
a community member facing eviction is to provide a community service.
Second, queer corporate attorneys should influence their employers and
clients to do justice. They can agitate for non-discrimination clauses and
domestic partnership plans at their firms and encourage clients to commit
to the same principles. Third, members of the gay corporate bar should
commit to increasing the ranks of lesbian/gay/bisexual attorneys. They
should join their local gay bar association and the National Lesbian and
Gay Law Association and mentor others interested in pursuing a career at

136. For example, a closeted queer lawyer might do enormous amounts of remarkably
beneficial legal work for the lesbian, gay, and bisexual community, work that could in certain
circumstances far exceed any gains of her coming out. Indeed, it is even arguable that such
work on behalf of the gay community by someone perceived (however erroneously) to be nongay is sometimes of greater value to the community than if that attorney came out.
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the bar. Fourth, responding to their place of relative financial privilege,
members of the queer corporate bar should give money to help support
community institutions. By and large, most corporate attorneys will have
more of it than others in these communities, and community organizations rely on these individual donations to survive and thrive.

The content that I would recognize as fulfilling the obligation thesis
exceeds these types of rather obviously affirming acts. Take the openly

gay corporate attorney who argues against (all) anti-discrimination laws
from a libertarian perspective. She could be seen as "doing harm" to her
community's interests in that large segments of that community are invested in a struggle to secure such non-discrimination protections.
Nonetheless, if the attorney were in a serious dialogue with her community, attempting sincerely to convince others of the wisdom of a general
anti-statist position vis-4-vis private discrimination, I would argue that

she is not doing harm to her community and, in fact, is engaged with
them in fulfillment of her obligations. In other words, the obligation thesis need not entail a "right answer" approach.137 Rather, it implores in-

dividuals to interact meaningfully with others in their community about
that community's interests. 38 In this sense, the many individual lesbians
and gay men who dispute the very concept of gay identity and argue
strenuously against anything following from their same-sex sexual desire
might even be viewed as fulfilling their obligations to others in their (self-

rejected) community if they were engaged in serious discourse around
these issues.

137. At times, Wilkins seems to agree:
[O]ne must... acknowledge that [the black attorney representing the Klan] has the
right to incorporate [his] deeply held personal beliefs [about civil liberties] into his
decisionmaking calculus. To do otherwise... is to raise race-based considerations to
the point where they suffocate black individuality.. .. Given this reality, integrity
does not imply a unitary, hierarchically ordered set of values that structures one's entire life plan, but instead resides in giving each competing commitment its moral due.
Wilkins, Klan?, supra note 86, at 1058-59.
138. For these same reasons, I have elsewhere criticized attorneys who claim to represent
their community in public interest lawsuits but who have not engaged with the community in the
dialogue that ought necessarily to precede such representations. See generally William B.
Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in
Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623 (1997). For example, some members of the lesbian, gay, and bisexual communities have argued that lawsuits challenging bans on same-sex
marriage are not in these communities' interests. See id. at 1635-39. My criticism has focused
not on the attorneys who undertake work that is controversial within their own community, but
rather on the subset of those attorneys who do so without consciousness of, or engagement with,
the controversy within the group they purport to represent. See id. at 1644-54.
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Do No Harm. Like Wilkins, I resist fully abandoning the project of
providing substantive content for the obligation thesis: at some point an
individual's actions may in fact do harm to her community. Several examples jump to mind. First, in recent high profile lawsuits, some attorneys opposing gay plaintiffs have put forth arguments that perpetuate un139
proven negative stereotypes about lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals.
Such arguments, even in "zealous" representation of clients in an adversary system, are rarely defensible, and, if undertaken by queer attorneys,
smack of hypocrisy as well as being legally misguided. Second, queer
corporate attorneys should be resistant to being "used" by those opposed
to gay community progress. In the age of identity politics, an openly gay
person who is willing to defend a corporation in a gay discrimination case
adds the imprimatur of her "identity" to the corporation's defense." 4
The attorney who has thought through the consequences of her position
on her own community has taken a first step. Having done so, she might
conclude that the gay complainant has not articulated a sound case,"' or
that her involvement in defending against the case can help bring about a
just solution to it. But she must be aware of the charged nature of her
representation and the ways in which her very involvement may itself do
harm to her community. Finally, and most importantly, implicit in the
obligation thesis is the notion that the ultimate "harm" to one's community is inaction. In this sense, an individual begins to fulfill her obligations to the community by entering the arena of discourse about the
community's goals and strategies' 42 and fails in her obligations to her
community by ignoring the larger context of her communal situation.
This vision of the obligation thesis is one that downplays (though does not
fully abandon) how particular individuals give meaning to these obliga-

139. For example, at trial in the Hawaii marriage case, see supra note 21, the state tried to
prove that same-sex marriages would adversely affect the optimal development of children, an
argument rejected as baseless by the trial court. See Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw.
Cir. Ct., Dec. 3, 1996).
140. The obligation thesis could, of course, be viewed as this same problem in reverse: the
"use" of an individual's "identity" by (in this instance) her community to promote its interests.
Given the moral grounding of an individual's obligation to her own community (as opposed to
the interests of third parties), however, the affirmative use is more defensible than the destructive deployment of identity.
141. And perhaps the poor case damages the very laws under which the plaintiff is suing.
142. See, e.g., The Aaron Diamond Foundation, Stoddard-Thomas, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
14, 1997, at A20 (obituary) ("Tom Stoddard didn't sit on the side lines. He was involved and
cared. May his life and work encourage all of us to do likewise.").
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tions while emphasizing the dedication and engagement they demonstrate

in doing so.
D.

Objections to the Obligation Thesis

(1) Wilkins'Responses

The primary challenge to Wilkins' thesis, and one with which he
grapples, is the argument that the thesis "is either premised on false
claims of racial essentialism or places unjustified moral weight on the
mere fact of racial identity."' 4 3 Wilkins outlines and responds to an en-

tire series of ways in which this "universalist" objection challenges the
moral basis of the obligation thesis. Of this series, three seem most salient." First, he asserts that even though the race-consciousness that underlies the obligation thesis is the product of race prejudice, it nonetheless
may give rise to moral obligations: "moral wrongs by one person do not
necessarily abrogate the moral obligations of another."' 45 Second, he responds to the claim that linking moral obligations to race "inevitably perpetuates the power of these artificially created categories instead of helping to stamp them out." 146 Wilkins contends that "the harm of
perpetuating race consciousness must be balanced against the harm of ig-

noring reality."147 He concedes that there exists a "danger that raceconsciousness may inadvertently perpetuate unjustified oppression,"48
but argues that:

143. Wilkins, supra note 1, at 1984.
144. Another three criticisms that Wilkins addresses are, in my view, less compelling.
First, he refutes the argument that the obligation thesis relieves whites of their responsibilities
to end racism. He agrees that whites have the central obligation to end racism, but contends
that this does not lessen the burden on blacks to work for this end as well. See id. at 2005-06.
See also Wilkins, Social Engineers, supra note 86, at 139-42. Second, Wilkins responds to the
critique that to the extent the obligation thesis is repayment for a debt owed past generations, it
is inherently ambiguous. See Wilkins, supra note 1, at 2007. He argues that those in the past
who created today's opportunities "would view adherence to the obligation thesis as a proper
method for black professionals to honor the sacrifices of other blacks on their behalf." Id. Finally, Wilkins acknowledges that racial solidarity can lead to negative outcomes but sees this as
a reason for vigilance, not false race-blindness. See id. at 2008.
145. Id. at 2003.
146. Id. at 2002.
147. Id. at 2004.
148. Id.
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IN COMMUNITIES BEGIN RESPONSIBILITIES

It may be true that blacks focusing on race make it more likely that
whites will do so as well. The opposite conclusion-that if blacks stop
49

focusing on race whites will too-seems a good deal less plausible.1
Third, Wilkins disproves the claim that race is an individual characteristic and that a group obligation can only be voluntarily selected by individual blacks. 50 For Wilkins, "the argument that the current generation of blacks neither 'accepted' nor 'requested' the benefits that they
received from the collective struggle by other blacks fails to acknowledge
the extent to which today's black professionals could not have existed
without these efforts."' 5'
(2) Objections to the Queer Obligation Thesis

Each of these objections could be levelled at the queer obligation
thesis and my responses would largely track Wilkins'. First, that sexual
orientation-consciousness is the product of heterosexism is surely true,
but this does not lessen the moral obligations of those jointly harmed by
heterosexism. Anti-semitism was not created by Jews, but it seems unobjectionable to argue that those who would identify, or be identified, as
Jews have some special obligation to work against anti-Semitism. It is
also fair to acknowledge that the sexual identity categories themselves are
a, if not the, means of oppression.'
Nonetheless, like Wilkins, I subscribe to the belief that, at least in the short run, it may be necessary to
embrace sexual-identity categories to ultimately overcome them."' And
finally, like Wilkins, I am not particularly moved by individual lesbians,
gay men, and bisexuals who fancy themselves individuals, unconnected
to and thus not responsible for their community. It is nearly impossible
for an adult in America today to have a relationship to these identity categories without having reaped the benefits of others' sacrifices to create

149. Id. at 2004-05.
150. See id. at 2006.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., John D'Emilio, Making and Unmaking Minorities: The Tensions Between
Gay History and Politics, in MAKING TROUBLE: ESSAYS ON GAY HISTORY, POLITICS, AND
THE UNIVERSrrY 181, 186-88 (1992); Mary McIntosh, The Homosexual Role, 16 SOCIAL
PROBLEMS 182 (1968), reprintedin RUBENsTEIN, supra note 10, at 124-30.

153. We should, at least, approach the argument against embracing identity with the same
degree of skepticism that we are urged to deploy in considering the argument for embracing
identity. See, e.g., Steven Seidman, DeconstructingQueer Theory or the Under-theorizationof
the Social and the Ethical, in SOCIAL POSTMODERNISM: BEYOND IDENTITY POLITICs 116
(Linda Nicholson & Steven Seidman eds., 1995).
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this freedom. The reciprocity principle demands something in return.
Wilkins nicely summarizes his response to this point in the Klan article:
Although [the black attorney's] racial identity does not define him, his
moral, economic, and spiritual connection to the black community does
have an important moral claim on his decisions, at least when those decisions are likely to have predictable consequences for other blacks. He
has an obligation to weigh these race-based considerations against both
legitimate professional duties (acquired by virtue of his status as a lawyer) and
his unique commitments as an autonomous member of soci15 4
ety.
Conclusion
As my central purpose here is to provoke a discussion about intracommunity obligations among lesbian, gay, and bisexual attorneys, and
their constituencies more generally, I can only hope that people will
disagree with what I have said. Yet, there is surely a preaching to the
choir quality to my call to arms. Being here, you have all taken on some
responsibility to help others in our communities. Nonetheless, I daily
counsel law students who are torn between the Scylla of not finding a
public interest job and the Charybdis of working in a law firm. Too
many of you march off to firms disgruntled with the public interest
world. Too often lawyers in the public interest world (and I would find
myself guilty of this) belittle the commitments and skills of those in
firms. The obligation thesis is an attempt to talk across these divides, to
begin to speak to and about one another-our histories, our commitments,
our values, our responsibilities to one another. Only through such a
conversation will we be able to meet for a third Hastings symposium
another eighteen years hence and remember the ways in which we were
discriminated against.

154.

Wilkins, Klan?, supra note 86, at 1043.

